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**Critique of Politeness theory:  
drawn on an analytical review of Eelen's book of politeness (2001)  
Abdurahman A hamza**

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**Abstract**

Politeness can be seen in almost every type of our interactions. It is usually observed even in the situation of conversational conflicts. However, not all researchers feel that it is necessary to assume a universality about the nature of politeness; maybe politeness works differently and has different emphases in different culture. For example in Muslim countries it seems to me that politeness is tied in with religion and one's relation to Allah and the community in a way in which it is not in Britain.

Thus, in this paper, I argue that in spite of the fact that the concentration has been on the move from politeness 2 to politeness 1, and the move from politeness 1 or the notion of commonsense to politeness 2 has not been discussed, they are both important in the course of interaction to the interactants. Nevertheless, it was claimed to be equally dangerous, in that insufficient awareness of its presence and importance could equally engender epistemological confusion between the ordinary speaker's and the scientist's position. However, the experts' view on these two perspectives are presented as well as analysis of them. In this review I analyse Eelen's outlook of what he considers as the main theories of the phenomenon of politeness as well as some other indirectly relevant theories. I will investigate Eelen's analysis of these theories of politeness in relation to the scholars of politeness's interpretation of the two perspectives of the notion of politeness.

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**Introduction**

Politeness is one of the very important issues in the field of sociolinguistics and pragmatics, as it touches everybody who communicates with others and does not live alone. It can be seen in almost every type of our interactions. Frazer states that "Politeness is a state that one expects to exist in every conversation".(1990:15). Because of its importance in relation to the people and society and its role in achieving the objectives of almost any type of interaction, some researchers are still trying to analyse it in different ways to find out more about its dimensions and exploit them to propose universal principles for people's interaction. However, not all researchers feel

that it is necessary to assume a universality about the nature of politeness; maybe politeness works differently and has different emphases in different culture. For example in Muslim countries it seems to me that politeness is tied in with religion and one's relation to Allah and the community in a way in which it is not in Britain.

This piece of writing aims to present different views of the issue of politeness and how it is looked in relation to two perspectives; politeness 1 or the commonsense notion of politeness and politeness 2 or the scientific notion of politeness. The experts' view on these two perspectives are presented as well as analysis of them. In this review I analyse Eelen's outlook of what he considers as the

main theories of the phenomenon of politeness as well as some other indirectly relevant theories. I will investigate Eelen's analysis of these theories of politeness in relation to the scholars of politeness's interpretation of the two perspectives of the notion of politeness.

#### **The distinction in politeness theory**

Eelen tries to look at the scientific theories to find about the distinction between politeness 1 and politeness 2 in them. He argues that the distinction is not made clear in all cases, Watts et al, (1992). Eelen (2001) argues that all the core theories include the two perspectives of politeness, i.e' politeness 1 and politeness 2. He believes that even if a theory pays more attention to one perspective of the two, or considers only one perspective explicitly, the other perspective also exists either implicitly or explicitly.

#### **Lakoff (1973) rules of pragmatics**

Eelen starts with Lakoff and considers her rules of politeness including the two perspectives of the notion of politeness. He argues that in spite of the fact that Lakoff does not explicitly mention the distinction between them, her rules of politeness are seen as part of a system of pragmatic rules. To Lakoff, the rules of politeness are parts of scientific way of capturing the systematicity of language use; they are not part of the way ordinary people talk about politeness (Eelen, 2001: 49). According to Eelen

This uniquely scientific viewpoint is also evidenced in the integration of politeness rules with Gricean CP and its maxims: rather than capturing ordinary speakers' argumentative evaluations, they are general linguistic principles, involved in the process of how people understand each other. (2001: 49)

Appropriateness is an important issues in Lakoff s looking of politeness. It includes general situational interaction, which

classifies people's interactional behaviour according to how they handle their interpersonal relationship. Eelen refers to Lakoff's interpretation as it emphasises the scientific view of the phenomenon of politeness. He states:

So Lakoff's notion of politeness derives from the specific viewpoint and goals of scientific investigation - it is specific to the practice of doing science-while it also, covers a boarder range of phenomena than ordinary speakers' conceptualisations and evaluations of politeness (2001: 49).

In addition to politeness 1 and her view of distance politeness, that is politeness and relationship, Eelen considers Lakoff's rules of politeness directly capture ordinary speaker's politeness 1 evaluation. For example , do not impose: remain aloof. He explains that:

The politeness discussed here is no longer about how scientists make sense of linguistic behaviour, but how people evaluate it in everyday interaction. It is an everyday evaluative system located in the heads of ordinary people (2001:50).

Depending on Eelen' s belief that there is an agreement between Lakoff's rules of politeness and Gricean's CP and his maxims, he argues that the two perspectives on the notion of politeness, i.e. politeness 1 and politeness 2 exist in her theory. Also Lakoff's notion of politeness is derived mainly from an anecdotal data and scientific investigation and her rules of politeness are parts of scientific facts that control the language use, and people, in their interaction, need them in their communication. These points make it clear that the two perspectives are existed in Lakoff' s principles and look inseparable as each is influenced by the other. According to Eelen:

This duality causes the distinction between politeness 1 and politeness 2 to become blurred, not only in the sense that the

distinction between spontaneous and scientific concepts is not adequately made and maintained, but also in the sense that the scientific concepts designed to capture politeness 1 are themselves involved in evaluating behaviour in terms of (im)politeness (Eelen 2001:50).

### **Brown and Levinson (1987) Universal Linguistic Politeness Strategies**

Brown and Levinson's theory is discussed from the same perspective. Eelen considers them to hold the same point of view that Lakoff has. In spite of the fact that their distinction between the two perspective has not been made explicit, it is still seen. Eelen agrees with them that they have their concept of politeness which is specially defined, but argues that:

their concept of politeness warns us that it should not be confused with an ordinary everyday understanding of the concept. It is a concept carved out by the linguist, in an attempt to grasp the relationship between language and social context" (Eelen, 2001: 50).

He also states that:

....the concept is a linguistic tool for explanation, not a spontaneous concept for evaluation. Moreover, this tool is constructed around the behaviour of a "model person", which is not to be confused with a real person ( 2001:51).

Thus, Brown and Levinson's concept of politeness also includes the linguistic tool used by interactants (model person) and the social context. So their theories includes a broader scope of the notion of politeness than the commensense notion. He refers this back to their conceptualisation of politeness as FTA redress.

The situations of ambiguity in Brown and Levinson's theory are exploited by Eelen to pinpoint his belief that the two perspectives of politeness exist in the theory. The issue that the impolite and polite acts are not clearly stated, and also the main topic of

their theory, i.e. FTAs is accurately specified, explains that the theory includes more issues than to be limited to just one perspective of politeness. Eelen states:

Although the exact relationship between FTA redress and politeness is never explicitly discussed, it is doubtful whether a promise, or preface a request by an offer would ordinarily be evaluated in terms of politeness, or the absence of the preface as impolite. On the other hand, politeness as FTA redress also implies that FTAs without redress would be considered impolite (2001, 51).

To me, Brown and Levinson's claim of universality, for example; their argument that negative politeness is redressive action addressed to the addressee's negative face, and it is specific and focused, as well as their other claim explains that their analysis has a broader scope than to be included in one of Eelen's perspectives of politeness. Even if their analysis seems to be confined to what they call 'model person' but the theory is claimed to be universal. This is clear in Eelen's view of face-wants

Consequently, the whole complex of face-wants, rationality and the notion of politeness as FTA redress is also granted psychological reality, so that ordinary speakers are implicitly assumed to make the same evaluations of speech acts in terms of (im)politeness as the theory does (Eelen, 2001:52).

Thus, Eelen holds that Brown and Levinson do not aim to cover only politeness 1, but aim for something broader and more general as long as their notion of politeness captures ordinary speakers' politeness notion.

Eelen concludes that the distinction between politeness 1 and 2 is not clearly set and the issue of (FTA) redressiveness, although it is not explicitly set, reflects their general look. He also concludes that Brown and Levinson are aware of politeness 1 and politeness 2 in

spite of the fact that they do not explicitly identify them.

**Leech (1983) politeness principles**

Eelen also considers the two perspectives of politeness to exist in Leech's Politeness Principles. He argues that Leech also shows an awareness of the distinction between politeness 1 and politeness 2 when he qualifies his framework as a "scientific paradigm" and situates it within pragmatics. Leech's principles or the maxims he proposes are to be interpreted as residing 'in the heads' of speakers, which implies that the general politeness principles would also be a commonsense concept.

What Eelen holds in Lakoff's rules of politeness and Brown and Levinson's FTA redressiveness seems to be similar in what he believes about Leech's pp. Eelen argues that "Leech's PP and Grice's CP are considered to be epistemologically and ontologically on a par; and the politeness principles(PP) and CP together enable the communication of indirect meaning... he states that:

the PP does provide specific stipulation on how to be polite: by 'minimizing the expression of impolite beliefs' and 'maximizing the expressions of polite beliefs', where (im)politeness is defined in terms of (un)favourableness to the hearer (2001, 54).

Leech's theory is thus very specific in predicting not only that these imperatives will be evaluated in terms of (im)politeness, but also which ones will be evaluated as more or less (im)politeness. According to Eelen, Leech's claim that his theory is more concerned with real people's communication is only one part of it. He argues that it is rather a theory of people in general, as it involves both the commonsense type as well as the scientific one.

**Ide (1989) Notion of discernment**

Eelen also holds that Ide's experimental research has implicitly included the two

perspectives of the notion of politeness. Eelen considers Ide's model awareness of the distinction between politeness 1 and politeness 2 is superficial. Ide's research aims for something with cross-cultural, universal validity, and the notion of politeness 1 and politeness 2 comes implicitly as its claim construct an abstraction from any local concepts.

Eelen consider Ide's notion of discernment which is part of the notion of politeness is more likely to discuss politeness 2 where politeness 1 is also existed. "So overall Ide's position regarding the distinction does not seem to be directly and unequivocally inferable from her own theorizing." Eelen, 2001:56).

Probably what confuses Eelen to classify Ide's theory to one perspective than the other for the notion of politeness or to what makes him think the distinction is implicit is her view of Brown and Levinson's and Leech's theories. Her explicit view of politeness 1 as an everyday concept and politeness 2 as strategies of language use distinguish her from the others, according to her definition, but "is her definition, rather her view about her research and about Brown and Levinson agreed by others? Isn't there a possibility that what she classifies as politeness 2 (strategies of language use)is a result of everybody concepts or is a commonsense politeness?

I think such question proposes itself as the classification is not possible, and if we are allowed to classify then there are some variables control this distinction. These variables, when they are cultural ones, make the distinction difficult if not impossible. Eelen states that:

both concepts of politeness are now posited as psychological reality in speakers' minds, as strategies resulting from the calculation of costs and gains, so the distinction between academic and everyday concepts no longer seems to hold. Instead we are left with a

view that separates etiquette or formal politeness (2001:57).

However, Eelen thinks that Ide's position regarding the distinction does not seem to be directly clear and that places her above the distinction. He argues that Ide's explicit reference to the politeness1-politeness2 distinction is offset by its equivocal definition, and although by subsuming both Volition (politeness2) and discernment (politeness1) her theory appears to place itself above the distinction; this is only seemingly true, since in order to accomplish this it needs to blur the distinction itself, watering it down to one between formal and strategic politeness.

#### **Blum-Kulka (1992) Cultural Norms**

Eelen also looks at Blum-Kulka's investigation in relation to the distinction between politeness 1 and politeness 2. It is investigated in relation to the commonsense notion of politeness. Her research appears to be based on empirical findings and contains elements that has definition of politeness in a broader sense, incorporating behaviour that would not ordinarily be evaluated in terms of politeness Eelen, 2001:57. In her investigation, some informants see politeness as 'very important' while others find it 'irrelevant' in the family context.

Politeness, to Blum-kulka, looks as if it is identified by its situational contextual factors that are associated with the interactants. Whilst I am not discussing Blum-Kulka's work, I should say that there are similarities, specially in the issues of the importance of politeness within family interaction, and also parents to their children, etc. Also her definition of social meanings as the degree in which any linguistic expression is deemed polite by members of a given culture in a specific situation.

as a relatively 'young' cultural group, native Israelis seem to be extremely sensitive to the range of social meanings attributable to

communicative modes. Such meanings can range from (possibly unnoticeable) social inappropriateness to attributions of strategic or even manipulative intent (Bul-kulka 1992:278, cited in Eelen, 2001:60).

Because Bulk-Kulka associates (im)politeness with social inappropriateness, Eelen considers her theory to discuss politeness 1, as (in)appropriateness is a result of evaluation made by one of the participants. However, if it is not noticed by both participants in an interaction, then there is simply no inappropriateness presented. According to Eelen, and from what the theory proposes, it is intended to be a psychological reality, and politeness, in the theory, is more associated with ordinary speakers' intention. Eelen also considers the same thing in Blum-Kulka that it mixes in the distinction between politeness 1 and politeness 2 However, such claim of the model makes, as others, mix the two perspectives of the notion of politeness.

#### **Gu (1992) culture-specific notion of politeness**

Gu's approach, in much the same way as Ide, is built on a culture-specific notion of politeness: According to Eelen, Gu clearly aims for politeness 1. His notion of politeness is based on Leech's, as it consists of a number of maxims, with the addition of an explicitly morel component, and also manifests itself in ordinary speakers' mind. Gu incorporates the choice between performing or not performing an action into the system of politeness under the header of content-regulating maximization (minimization): which refers to the actual cost/benefit involved in an action (Eelen 2001:61).

Eelen thinks that there are indications in the theories that it places it in politeness 1 perspective. Eelen believes, from the examples he provides, that because of a

number of reasons one perspective looks more clear than the other in Gu's model.

In light of Gu's definition of politeness as a set of moral rules and obligations, the declinations thus serve the purpose of finding out whether the inviter was 'being sincere' or 'being polite' in issuing the invitation. This directly contradicts the notion that invitations are intrinsically polite, and the latter can only be maintained if the evaluation of politeness not emanate from the interactants themselves, but from the theory." (Eelen, 2001:62)

This view according to Eelen, seems to be aiming at politeness 2 as it contradicts the notion of ordinary speaker and emphasises the academic notion (politeness 2).

#### **Fraser and Nolen (1981) judging politeness**

Eelen describes Fraser and Nolen's model as an approach which aims to analyse politeness 2. Their definition of the notion of politeness is "staying within the then-current terms of the CC. "So the CC determines the proper amount of deference to be paid, while the actual amount of deference paid determines whether a speaker is 'polite' or 'impolite'." (Eelen, 2001:65) In spite of the fact that their approach attempts to set up a rank order of linguistic structure on a high low deference scale, which usually refers to politeness 1, but Eelen holds that in their empirical model the ordinary speakers' intuitive notions of deference cannot be trusted. They argue that

... it is very clear that one cannot follow the linguistic tradition and appeal directly to the intuition of the native speaker to sort out he degree of deference associated with particular expressions." (Fraser and Nolen, 1981:93, cited in Eelen, 2001:65)

Frazer and Nolen's analysis mainly aims to understand what goes on in the speakers' mind, which is Eelen believes that the research methodology does not guarantee

that. The experiment was concerned with deference, not politeness. And since judgements of (im)politeness depend on whether or not the hearer perceives the speaker to have used the appropriate amount of deference, they are completely independent of any ranking of linguistic structures on a deference scale. Concerning their methodology Eelen argues that their method of analysis brings into practise their conviction that ordinary speakers' judgements cannot be trusted, and need to be somehow 'corrected' by scientific analysis (2001: 67).

However, to Eelen, their epistemological foundation has discussed the two perspectives: the scientific politeness (politeness 2) as well as (politeness 1) the commonsense politeness, as their judgement in the hands of the hearer.

#### **Arndt and Janney (1985) Socio-Psychological Approach**

Arndt and Janney consider the existing theoretical frameworks as placing politeness outside actual speakers and hearers. Eelen consider their explicit focus on intuitive concepts places them in politeness 1 as they argue for a shift from logical approach to a socio-psychological approach in which the people are the locus of language and politeness. The methodology of their experiment is based on the observation of the intuitive evaluations of utterances to examine the notion of group role identity.

Observation is important in the formation of linguistic theory insofar as it enables the linguist to determine which theoretical concepts are intersubjectively valid and which require more thought." (Arndt and Janney 1993:108, cited in Eelen, 2001:69)

Arndt and Janney argue that sincerity is associated with politeness, and that assumes that speakers are not intentionally misleading hearers, as supportiveness and politeness are interchangeable in their

framework. Eelen considers Bulk-Kulka (1992) investigation contradicts their model as the Bulk-Kulka associates commonsense notion of politeness with hypocritical, insincere behaviour, and they associate it with sincerity.

“Arndt & Janney seem to want it both ways. They want their concept of politeness to be a scientific representation of what goes on inside speakers' heads, but when their conceptual line of reasoning is continued far enough, and put to the practical test of exemplification, it leads to evaluative results which are commonsensically highly questionable. (72 Eelen)

However, Eelen considers Arndt and Janney's concept of politeness to square in scientific notion of politeness, politeness 2, does not seem to do with commonsense notion.

#### **Watts (1995) social interaction**

Watt, according to Eelen, is quite clear to the concept of politeness. His general epistemological and methodological approach to research indicates a concern for understanding and capturing ordinary speakers' assessments of the interactional process. (Eelen, 2001:72)

The theoretical aim thus seems to be politeness1, which is further confirmed by the relationship between the polite-politic and the politeness 1-politeness 2 distinction, where the mere choice of terms suggests a parallelism (Eelen, 2001, 72).

Eelen also states that Watts' framework aims more to politeness 2 than to politeness 1 as it is claimed. He states:

So when we take a closer look at the kinds of behaviour that would be classified as 'polite' on the basis of watts' conceptual definition, it appears from intuition as well as from other invistagators' empirical research that ordinary speakers would often not agree. In spite of theoretical claims to the contrary, Watts'concept of politeness

seem to have more of a politeness 2 than a politeness 1 (Eelen, 2001:73).

Here the views of Watts and Eelen' s analysis are not presented as they are complicated and no space to mention the point that is worth mentioning here is that in spite of Watts's claim that he is aiming at politeness 1, or the notion of the commonsense, Eelen could argue that politeness 2 is more targeted, i.e. the scientific notion of politeness.

“In Watts' framework, it thus fully qualifies as politic but not as polite behaviour. This position, however, can arguably deviate from commonsense notion of politeness.2 eelen. 2001:74)

From what has been summarized we can understand that the mentioned theories have discussed what is called politeness 1 and politeness 2 perspectives. It is true that they vary in their distinctions of these perspectives, but each of the theories has discussed both of them, and differently left one of the two perspectives implicit while concentrating on the other. Eelen concludes that the aspects which refer to politeness 1 are found in almost all frameworks; for example what goes on in the speaker's mind: ordinary speakers' interpretation of their utterances (local principles or non local principles i.e. politeness 1 and politeness 2).

Thus, regardless to what is more clear or targeted in the frameworks, politeness 1 and politeness 2 are always present in them, which reflects the importance of both perspectives. That is one suggestion, the other suggestion is that they are expressing one another and might not be possible to cope up with one without the other. Eelen states:

The presence of both sides of the distinction in each and every account further suggests that both intrinsic and thus inevitable aspects of scientific accounts. They are inseparably interconnected, so that any theory



necessarily incorporates aspects of both, and an unequivocally one-sided position is in practice impossible.” (Eelen, 2001:76)

Eelen refers the ambiguous position of the theories concerns the distinction of the notion of politeness to the general lack of the awareness of its importance and influence. The main point that Eelen concentrates on here is the importance of everybody to understand his/her position in relation to the distinction, and the possible conclusions or next steps this position warrants (Eelen 2001:76).

Eelen proposes Emic and Etic terms to explain the politeness 1 and politeness 2 distinction. In relation to these terms, Eelen tries to assign each one to refer to certain categories in the process of interaction. Depending on other’ s definitions of Etics and Emics, Eelen argues that in spite of the controversy that exist in interpreting the terms, they still refer to each other. He argues “Etic accounts refer to outsiders’ account of insiders’ behaviour, involves distinctions not relevant to those insiders.” (Eelen, 2001:78). Also, he states “Emic’ can thus refer both to how a native informants conceptualise his own behaviour, as well as to what actually goes on in the native informant’s head while performing the behaviour in question.” (Eelen, 2001:77) He associate human behaviour, which is the object of any research or investigation, as emics. Elen says:

But scientific description mostly aim to achieve more than this: they aim, for example, to integrate the description in a cross-cultural comparison, or to trace the relationship of behaviour to psychological or sociological insights and so on. In all of these cases, the description will necessarily be etic.” (Eelen, 2001:78)

How the frameworks handle the presence of both aspects, and how the two aspects are related to each other within the theories.

... both aspects can also be seen to be present in the politeness theories under investigation. The emic side of research is present in both the search for (conscious) commonsense concepts of politeness, as well as in the study of actors’ (unconscious) distinctive social interactional practices.” (Eelen, 2001:78)

However, Eelen argues that the mix between frameworks that involve the conscious commonsense concept of politeness and those which involve scientific concept of politeness always existed. He puts it in the following way: “In other words, etics become emics again; for example, Blum-Kulka’s cultural scripts are claimed to be involved in determining “ ... the degree to which any linguistic expression is deemed polite by members of a given culture in a specific situation. (Blum-Kulka 1992:275, cited in Eelen, 2001:79 )

Also Eelen discusses the cultural expectations and their role in both; the first thing to constitute appropriate social behaviour in relation to what is polite and what is impolite; and second to construct a ground that the attractants can use to maintain good relation in their process of interaction.

The etic notions are, so to speak, implemented back into speakers’ mind: they become part of the way speakers arrive at their everyday distinctive practices regarding politeness, they are notions the speakers rely on in marking distinctive evaluations. (Eelen, 2001:79)

“At first, volition and discernment are deployed as (etic) scientific notions to capture individual vs social aspects of social interaction” (Eelen, 2001:80)

When concrete examples are discussed, this notion of politeness is simply transferred to a speaker, as the utterance is said to result from ‘politeness consideration. As etics and emics are never discussed; the relationship between the scientists and the ordinary

speaker's concepts of politeness can be direct, immediate, straightforward, one-to-one.

### Conclusion

However, discussing politeness in relation to one notion or more, or one theory or more might not lead to appropriate understanding, defining or analysing of politeness. Eelen himself argues that discussing the issue of politeness in just two notions is not enough and basic. This means that the theoretical frameworks simply do not make the distinction, and thus cannot be expected to engage in a detailed discussion of evaluativity, normativity, variability and (im)politeness1 gumentivity of politeness. It is therefore a model of rather than politeness2, and it makes no claim to be cross-culturally universal, even though we can expect other speech communities to apply roughly equivalent attribution in other language or varieties. Watts further argues that in Sperber and Wilson's terms any utterance within a discourse is a stimulus which alters the cognitive environment of

the hearer(s). In making the utterance, the speaker goes on record as having done something which is ostensibly manifest to his hearer(s) and which alters the context within which the speaker and the hearer(s) are interacting socially (2003:209).

Thus I conclude that in spite of the fact that the concentration has been on the move from politeness 2 to politeness, and the move from politeness 1 or the notion of commonsense to politeness 2 has not been discussed, they are both important in the course of interaction to the interactants. Nevertheless, it was claimed to be equally dangerous, in that insufficient awareness of its presence and importance could equally engender epistemological confusion between the ordinary speaker's and the scientist's position.

### نقد لنظرية التآدب في الحوار:

مبنى علي مراجعة تحليلية لكتاب إيلين (Eelen 2001) للتآدب في الحوار  
عبد الرحمن أحمد حمزة

### الملخص

التآدب في الحوار هو أحد القضايا المهمة جداً في ميدان فلسفة اللغة القصدية (pragmatics) وله علاقة بكل شخص موجود في اي نوع من الحوار مع الآخرين ولا يعيش لوحده. هو إذا يُمكن أن يُرى تقريباً في كل أنواع الحوار و أنواع التخاطب. فرايزر (Frazer) يُصرح "بأن التآدب في التحدث هو الحالة التي يتوقع وجودها في كل حوار". وبسبب أهميته و دوره في علاقة الناس والمجتمع بعضهم بعضاً ودوره في إنجاز هدف أي نوع من الحوار فإن بعض الباحثين ما زالوا يُحاولون تحليله بطرق مختلفة لإكتشاف أبعاده واستغلالها لإقتراح أسس عالمية له. على أية حال، ليس كل الباحثون يشعرون بأنه من الضروري افتراض أسس عالمية حول طبيعة التآدب في الحوار وانه ربما كان التآدب في الحوار له شكل مختلف وله تأكيدات مختلفة من ثقافة الي اخرى. على سبيل المثال في البلدان الإسلامية يبدو لي بأن التآدب يُفق مع الدين وعلاقة الشخص مع الله و المجتمع بطريقة مختلفة عن ما هو عليه في بريطانيا وربما سبب هذا الارتباط سو فهم بين المتحاورين. من البريطانيين و العرب.

هذه الورقة تهدف الي تقديم وجهات نظر مختلفة لباحث في قضية التآدب في الحوار وكيف تحلل وذلك من خلال منظورين رئيسيين هما المنظور العامي commonsense وهي النظرة (1): و المنظور العلمي (scientific view) وهي النظرة (2) للتآدب. سيتم في هذه الورقة عرض وجهات نظر الخبراء في هذا المجال فيما يخص هذين المنظورين المقدمان بالإضافة إلى تحليلهما. إذا سوف أقوم بمراجعة و تحليل وجهة نظر Eelen فيما يعتبره نظريات رئيسية لظاهرة التآدب في الحوار بالإضافة إلى نظريات أخرى ذات علاقة بشكل غير مباشر من خلال المنظورين رئيسيين المذكورين.

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